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Feminist Aesthetics, Popular Music, and the Politics of the “Mainstream”


While feminist aestheticians have long interrogated gendered, raced, and classed hierarchies in the arts, feminist philosophers still don’t talk much about popular music.​[1]​  Even though Angela Davis and bell hooks have seriously engaged popular music, they are often situated on the margins of philosophy.​[2]​  It is my contention that feminist aesthetics has a lot to offer to the study of popular music, and the case of popular music points feminist aesthetics to some of its own limitations and unasked questions. This essay addresses the paucity of work in feminist philosophy and popular music by (1) applying insights from other areas of feminist aesthetics (the role of gender in the art/craft distinction, concepts of genius and creativity, notions of active spectatorship, etc.) to questions of popular music, and (2) thereby using feminist aesthetics – specifically, Julia Kristea’s notion of female genius and the genius spectator – to critique itself.   
I argue that it is essential, for reasons both philosophical and political, that feminist aesthetics seriously engage mainstream popular music.  Philosophically, many of the aims and claims of feminist aesthetics are consistent with and indeed demonstrate the value of serious scholarship about popular music; as I argue in the third section of the paper, Kristeva’s re-valuation of the feminine/feminized spectator provides a useful model for thinking about genres of music that are typically trivialized via feminization.  Politically, mainstream popular music is an important area for analysis in feminist aesthetics for two main reasons.  First, because it is a field in which women, particularly women of color, have made significant if not canonical contributions to Western culture generally, to ignore popular music as a domain of feminist inquiry is to discount some of the most vital ways that women have contributed to Western civilization.  To claim that mass culture is inherently disempowering is to completely ignore the fact that many women have, in their production and consumption of commodity music, achieved both personal and group empowerment.  Second, if mainstream popular music is what many or most people actively or passively consume, and if all feminist theorizing is, at some level, grounded in and aiming at real-world political change, then it can only help to take account of and analyze the various ways that gender impacts the kinds of music that lots of people actually listen to.  

I. Why is popular music overlooked in feminist aesthetics?
	I have always been somewhat surprised that feminist aestheticians pay so little attention to popular music – especially since contemporary Western popular music is a field in which female artists are very prominent and successful, and in which issues of sexual and racial politics are perennially debated (e.g., misogyny in hop-hop).  Hypatia’s special issue on “Women, Art, Aesthetics” (Vol. 18, No. 4 Fall/Winter 2003) had no articles about music, let alone popular music; similarly, Carolyn Korsmeyer’s recent book “Gender and Aesthetics” has only a short section on music of any sort.​[3]​  These examples evince the general marginalization of music within philosophical aesthetics; combined with the continued marginalization of feminism within philosophy, U.S. feminism’s historical problems with race and class diversity, and the left’s general distaste for anything commercial, this fact helps begin to explain why feminist aesthetics has forgotten or ignored popular music.  
Given current norms in the field, feminist work in popular culture in general, and popular music in particular, are not taken seriously as “real” philosophical endeavors.  It is not coincidental that, in Plato’s Symposium, the flute girls are dismissed so that the real philosophical discussion can begin.​[4]​  More recently, Steven Asma’s review of William Irwin’s “Philosophy and Popular Culture” series situates pop culture as philosophy’s exocitized other, the “sugar” or “spice” (and probably “everything nice,” too) that makes so-called hard-core philosophy more palatable for non-specialists.​[5]​ Asma and Irwin imply that real philosophy is everything femininity and pop culture are not.  One reason why feminist aestheticians might avoid discussing popular music is that it could be difficult to build a career with this area of specialization, given the discipline’s hostility/structural blindness to both feminism and popular culture.	
	Another reason why feminist aestheticians tend to have avoided popular music is the general skew towards visual media in philosophical aesthetics.  Western philosophers tend to be quite aware of our canon’s and our culture’s occularcentrism: vision is the privileged metaphor for knowledge.​[6]​  The only major figures in the history of Western philosophy to write extensively about music were also musicians: Rousseau, Nietzsche, Adorno, and Deleuze. In addition to philosophy’s general occularcentrism, psychoanalysis is particularly partial to the visual; this, along with the popularity of psychoanalysis in feminist philosophy, is one reason why music is not a common topic in feminist aesthetics.  Aside from Julia Kristeva, psychoanalysts just don’t talk about music; even Kristeva uses music mostly as an example or an aside, and rarely discusses it at length.​[7]​  Freud talks extensively about painting and sculpture (Michelangelo, Leonardo),​[8]​ and Lacanian psychoanalysis, with its investment in the theory of the mirror stage and the gaze, offers a form or a structure which encourages and privileges sight, looking relations, and visual media.  Within feminist aesthetics, film is certainly a, if not the, privileged medium. From the “male gaze” to the “oppositional gaze,” the popularity of psychoanalysis as a feminist methodology/discourse has effected – probably unintentionally – a sort of structural blindness to music and overwhelming emphasis on the visual, particularly film (which is ironic, because film is also an auditory medium).	
Yet another possible reason for popular music’s absence from feminist aesthetics stems from history of US feminism, specifically, its origins in bourgeois society and its allegiance with the contemporary left: as Linda Scott has argued (Scott 2004), for different reasons, both groups are suspicious of commercial and commodity relations.  Scott’s book on U.S. feminism’s troubled relation with fashion (one aspect of pop culture targeted predominantly at women) provides both historical evidence and cogent arguments demonstrating U.S. feminism’s general hostility towards anything commercial. One of the cultural implications of U.S. feminism’s roots among white bourgeois women, according to Scott, is that feminists tended to carry with them their class’s distaste for commercial activities and the market itself, both in work and in leisure.​[9]​  On the other side of the coin, many contemporary feminisms are filtered through the left’s Marxian suspicion of capitalism and commodificaiton.  If the market is inherently disempowering (particularly to women), then mass culture and commodity music cannot, so the logic goes, be properly feminist objects of study or practice.  Thus, while feminist aestheticians and art historians do extensively examine folk cultures (e.g., quilting, needlework), mass culture is considered inherently demeaning (from both bourgeois and Marxist perspectives), and a dead-end for “genuinely” feminist theorizing.  The conscious or unconscious perpetuation of these biases against commercial/mass culture is especially surprising for two reasons: (1) because so much art in the last forty to fifty years has called into question the traditional distinction between “high” and “mass” culture, and (2) because of what Andreas Huyssen has called the “feminization of the popular” (i.e., the tendency to de-value mass culture by associating it with an already de-valued femininity.  See Huyssen 1985).  What is lost in this is not only a vast chunk of cultural production, but the very real accomplishments of many female musicians, businesspeople, and music fans.  As in fashion, pop music is a field in which women – particularly women of color – are both successful as artists and important as tastemakers.  To uncritically dismiss or overlook popular music is to trivialize women’s accomplishments – not something feminists should want to do.
	I am not trying to fault anyone in particular; indeed, I hope I have made clear that the marginalization of femininity, pop culture, and the feminized popular are systematic biases implicit in most philosophical and feminist practice.  As I show below, I find the insights of feminist aesthetics/aestheticians to be extremely valuable, especially as resources for thinking about the politics of popular music.  What is problematic is that a huge portion of contemporary cultural life/production is vastly undertheorized within philosophy in general, feminist philosophy in particular.  This is not to say that there isn’t truly excellent feminist work in pop music in other disciplines.​[10]​  However, it is important that philosophy be able to pose these same insights in its own language, the language of aesthetics.  It is important that feminist aestheticians engage popular music for both philosophical and political reasons.  Taking popular music seriously as the object of feminist philosophical inquiry not only provides insight into feminist aesthetics, but it also actively engages feminist theorizing with real-world, everyday ways in which many average people live their gender and race, i.e., with the ways that gender and race are at work in cultural forms that many people consume and care about.





	I take the primary insight of feminist aesthetics to be that the Western definitions of “art” and “artistry” were and are gendered terms, specifically, terms that normalize, and thus privilege, stereotypical white, heterosexual masculinity.  As Linda Nochlin so clearly expresses it, “the problem here lies” not (primarily) in conscious discrimination against female artists on the basis of their gender, but in a “misconception of what art is” (Nochlin 1998, 315).  To put it in the terms Charles Mills uses in The Racial Contract, the reason why “there are no great women artists” is fundamentally epistemological: just as the Racial Contract is an epistemological contract “prescribing norms for cognition to which its signatories must adhere” (Mills 1997, 11) there exists a skewed set of cognitive norms governing what counts as “art” and who counts as an “artist”.  The concepts themselves are gendered; because the “bias,” so to speak, is in the concepts, the marginalization of women and femininity results from the correct (rather than the “skewed” or prejudiced) implementation of them.  In this section, I will briefly flesh out some of the ways that feminist aestheticians’ insights into gendered cognitive norms about art apply to a feminist (re)consideration of popular music.  Specifically, I will examine the gendering of the art/craft distinction and its manifestation in serious/pop hierarchies, and the gendered agency of both the performer and the audience.


a.	Art/Craft and Serious/Pop Hierarchies
The serious/pop hierarchy is in many ways the specifically musical version of the more broad fine art/craft distinction, a topic to which many feminist aestheticians have devoted considerable attention.​[11]​  Although some might object that popular music is relatively easily distinguished from serious music because the former is produced for a specifically commercial purpose, commercialization is an insufficient criterion, because, as Adorno argued, Beethoven and other aspects of the art music scene have been thoroughly commodified.​[12]​  Other than gender associations, there is no single feature or set of features that consistently distinguishes “popular” from “serious” music.  Thus, the serious/popular hierarchy cannot be understood apart from its gender politics (assuming, of course, that gender is inseparable from and intersectional with other identity categories such as race, class, and sexuality).  The insights of feminist aesthetics give philosophical grounding to musicologist Susanne Cook’s claim that Western popular music’s hierarchical marginalization is, at least in large part, a function of its feminization (Cook 2001).
Roziska Parker and Griselda Pollock famously locate the origin of the art/craft distinction in “the intersection in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries of the development of an ideology of femininity, that is, a social definition of women and their role, with the emergence of a clearly defined separation of art and craft” (Parker & Pollock 1998, 46).  These two hierarchical binaries – masculine/feminine, fine art/craft – gained their sense and justification in terms of one another: art was “art” because it was endowed with all the characteristics of stereotypical masculinity (intellect, publicness, universality), and craft was “craft” because it was associated with all the characteristics of stereotypical femininity (embodiment, domesticity, subjectivity).​[13]​  As musicologist Susan Cook argues, 
‘the popular,’ as the lesser category, has been so thoroughly feminized…[It] carries with it a staggering cultural baggage, a trunk full of social codes that have been historically attached to womankind and underprivileged men (Cook 2001, 140).

Comparing Cook’s and Parker & Pollock’s analyses demonstrates that the art/craft and serious/popular hierarchies are but different expressions of the same underlying gender hierarchy, one wherein masculinity gains its privileged position via the exclusion of what a patriarchal society deems “feminine.”  Any specific content can fall under either side of the binary; what is consistent is the devaluation of whatever specific content is feminized.  This is what Cook means when she says: “I was a girl, and my music sucked by definition, the way ‘girl’ music has always sucked, whether it’s been ‘sentimental ballads,’ ‘salon music,’ ‘musical theater,’ ‘soft rock,’ or ‘boy bands’” (Cook 2001, 140). Because popular/commercial music is a field in which women have, historically, been extremely successful as artists and highly influential as tastemakers, the exclusion of pop/commercial music from consideration as “real” art functions to discount women’s accomplishments as valuable contributions to society.  Thus, what motivates these hierarchies, in all their varied forms, is “a real fear of dealing with female desire and female consumption, of valuing women, and especially girls, as thinking, knowledgeable consumers and critics who have enormous power in the commercial and aesthetic marketplace” (Cook 2001, 140).  Women exhibit creative, entrepreneurial, and critical agency in the creation, distribution, and reception of popular music; so long as pop music is excluded from serious consideration both as an artform and within philosophy, real instances of women’s agency continue to be trivialized, their voices silenced. 

b.	Genius & creativity
As Christine Battersby has so compellingly demonstrated, Western civilization has consistently gendered the “genius” as masculine (Battersby 1989).  There is one paradoxical aspect to the genius’s gendering that is particularly instructive for analyzing contemporary popular music: stereotypically feminine in some ways, the genius, like the pop music performer, is hypermasculine in others.  In Battersby’s account, traditional conceptions of genius “praised ‘feminine’ qualities in male creators…but claimed that females could not – or should not – create” (Battersby 1989, 3).  Stereotypically feminine qualities such as “instinct, emotion, sensibility, intuition, imagination” and “even madness” (Battersby 1989, 3), which, when exhibited by females and underprivileged males, were evidence of inferiority and the incapacity for cultural accomplishment (e.g., colonial narratives about natives’ irrationality), were, when exhibited by privileged men, evidence of their genius.  Geniuses were, in a sense, hypermasculine men, even if outwardly they appeared stereotypically effeminate, for they had the strength of intellect and/or force of will to sublimate qualities which, in weaker beings, prevented genuine creativity. Thus, Battersby claims that “the genius was male – full of ‘virile’ energy – who transcended his biology: if the male genius was ‘feminine’ this merely proved his cultural superiority” (Battersby 1989, 3). These “feminine” characteristics are also frequently attributed to non-white men (e.g., the hypersexualization of black men).  Because this femininity is evidence of the supposed inferiority of non-white men, it is only white masculinity that is thought to be “strong” or “sublime” enough to overcome the threats posed by femininity (and by non-whiteness).​[14]​ Thus one component of the genius’s “superior” masculinity is his whiteness.  In the end, when these traits appear in privileged individuals (white men) they are evidence of their cultural superiority, but when they appear in underprivileged individuals, they are evidence of these individuals’ cultural inferiority.
	Gayle Wald and Joanne Gottleib describe the gendering of the rock performance position in terms which parallel Battersby’s description of the genius: as object of the scopophilic gaze, the performer is feminized, and is thus compelled to assert a hyperbolically masculine performance.
Within rock performance, there is a struggle with femininity that may stem from the feminine gendering of the performance position itself… If early rock ‘n’ roll performers acquired their primary mass appeal as the objects of female heterosexual desire (e.g. Beatlemaina), the translation of rock performance into a predominantly male system relies on the performer’s delicate posturing as both erotic and identificatory object.  To the extent that the rock audience was male, the male performer generated anxiety around the erotics of the gaze…The exaggerated masculinity of certain rock performances may attempt to recoup the gender discomfort that ensures when men openly display sexuality and assume a to-be-looked-at position among men (Gottleib and Wald 1994, 259; emphasis mine).

A performer genuinely “rocks” when he can adopt the feminized position of sexualized object of the gaze, but overcome the objectification inherent therein by asserting his masculine, virile agency. Conventionally feminine qualities such as embodiment and sexual objectification, whey they appear in exceptional male artists, are evidence of their musical prowess; however, when these qualities appear in women, they are evidence of their musical incompetence.  In the US and Britain, however, these gender stereotypes are gendered through racialization.  Ingrid Monson notes that “black…musicians, and more generally African American music, have come to symbolize political liberation, emotional depth, and sensual intensity” (Monson 1995, 405).  When white male performers adopt the musical and corporeal stylings of black (specifically, African-American) males, what is in its original context (black male bodies), a source of fear and a justification for social marginalization, becomes evidence of these white male performers’ ingenuity.  Musicologist Susan McClary argues that, for whites, black music such as the “blues seem[s] to offer an experience of sexuality that was unambiguously masculine” (McClary 2000, 55).  When this sexuality appeared in the bodies of black men, it was considered socially dysfunctional; when it appears in the bodies of white men, it is artistically functional.  As with the genius, the pop music performer is normatively white and masculine, for only bodies which possess those attributes are capable of transforming what is otherwise vice (femininity, blackness) into a virtue. 

c.	Gendering the Audience
Not only is the artist normatively white and masculine, but the audience member is as well: an encounter with “art” supposedly requires all the masculine “virtues,” such as intellectual and personal fortitude.  In her reading of Kant’s description of the highest form of aesthetic experience (i.e., sublimity), Battersby identifies two versions of Kant’s account; what differentiates the accounts is the specific aspect of stereotypical masculinity exercised in each.  In Kant’s first formulation of the sublime, one withstands a sexualized intellectual violence: “the sublime is described as a natural force that overpowers and overwhelms the spectator by a kind of mental rape” (Battersby 1998, 229).  In the formulation that  appears in the Third Critique, one actively asserts one’s mastery over something difficult to understand, interpret, or comprehend: “It is the difficult, the challenging, and the overcoming of obstacles that Kant most values; these are characteristics identified with the ‘sublime,’ and restricted to male human beings” (Battersby 1998, 230). To experience the sublime, one must struggle to withstand or overcome something harsh and difficult.  If part of that struggle involves the repudiation of femininity (weakness, softness, etc.), then the experience of sublimity is especially harmful for women.  It is no wonder, then, that women – who are, by virtue of their femininity and their femaleness, already targets for violence and discrimination in Western patriarchal cultures – might reject outright this paradigm which asks them to yet again open themselves to another form of misogyny and violence. 
  Rather than accede to cultural norms which they “found unappealingly violent” (Nash 2003, 136), such as sublimity or the rock performer’s aforementioned hypermasculinity, some teen girls rejected the imperative to develop “mature” (i.e., masculine) tastes and behaviors, finding agency instead in activities which dominant culture trivializes as immature, conformist, or unthinking.​[15]​  “While young women’s engagement with popular music is typically dismissed as teenybopperism, with all the eager, bland mainstream consumerism that the term implies,” Gottleib and Wald argue that gendered notions of creativity and critical consumption produce a structural blindness to “the creative, identity-forming, even ingenious work that pre-teenage girls accomplish – given the rigid parameters of their lives – through this sort of fandom” (Gottleib and Wald 1994, 7)  Similarly, Ilana Nash argues that “being teenyboppers was how we fought back.  That gave us our first taste of autonomy, strange as though it may sound to link a mass-marketed, commodified activity with ‘autonomy’” (Nash 2003, 137).  Conventional definitions of “autonomy” and aesthetic appreciation (i.e., those which consider mass-marketed, commodified activity as a form of false consciousness) assume a privileged spectator; teen girls don’t have access to the privileges which make such “autonomy” possible, so they reconfigure it in terms available to them.​[16]​  In refusing to withstand or overcome something they find harmful (i.e., the masculinized dynamics of sublimity or rockism), these teen girls are clearly adopting a critical perspective towards art. However, because their aesthetic experience does not conform to the masculinized norms governing what constitutes “real” or “active” aesthetic appreciation, their agency is discounted as such, by both dominant culture and by those aforementioned feminists whose class or Marxian allegiances cause them to devalue commercial activity. 

A sort of aesthetic “epistemology of ignorance” works to foreclose from women the possibility of aesthetic agency: because art, genius, and spectatorship are all normatively masculine, nothing that women do can/will be seen for what it is, i.e., meaningful, critical engagement with art.​[17]​ It is my claim that feminist aesthetics has demonstrated that Western definitions of art, genius, and spectatorship are grounded in a “cognitive disfunction which is psychologically and socially functional” (Mills 1997, 18), namely, the misrecognition of women’s aesthetic agency as such.




IV.  The genius of the spectator and the politics of the mainstream


While feminist musicologists and cultural theorists have convincingly argued that pop culture’s feminization requires feminists to reconsider its aesthetic and political value and both its creators’ and audiences’ aesthetic and political agency, Kristeva is never hesitant in her criticism of “the society of the spectacle,” the culture industry, and Western pop culture in general.  Her condemnations are grounded in their supposedly passivizing and disempowering effects: they discourage the “European culture of critique” in favor of thoughtless consumption and the “new maladies of the soul.”  However, in her work on female genius, especially the volume on Arendt, Kristeva elaborates a theory of the feminine spectator as party to free action: the latter does not exist as such without a spectator or group of spectators to recognize it as such by recounting it in narrative form (Kristeva 2001).  Kristeva’s notion of the “genius spectator” both critiques and re-establishes gendered aesthetic hierarchies.  This tension gives rise to a number of questions: What makes the genius spectator different from the member of the society of the spectacle, given that the agency of both types of individuals (1) requires the apprehension of appearances as such, (2) involves participation in a group of co-spectators, and (3) falls outside active/passive binaries? Considering that Kristeva’s conception of (female) genius is in large part a rethinking of traditional categories of aesthetic value, what are the relevant differences between the audience to the spectacle and the genius spectator?  If her critique of subjectivity, agency, and embodiment voids many of the foundational assumptions of traditional serious/pop hierarchies, on what basis does Kristeva privilege the “genius spectator” over the pop culture consumer?  While her actual discussions of popular culture reinforce the gendered serious/pop hierarchies she otherwise so powerfully dismantles, Kristeva’s theoretical work critiques conventional notions of aesthetic value, and thus provides us with resources to demystify the feminization of popular culture.  Even though she perpetuates a folk/mass culture hierarchy which privileges the former term, her argument for the value of the feminized everyday or Alltags culture also demonstrates why it is important for feminists to take mass/pop culture seriously and engage the politics not just of the folk, but of the mainstream. 


a. The society of the spectacle

	Claiming that “labor turns the employees of the society of the spectacle into robots” (Kristeva 2001, 43), Kristeva describes a milieu in which the process and product of activity achieve the objectification of the agent: labor makes the laborer into a thing, the artist says nothing in his or her work.​[18]​  Kristeva situates her analysis of this non-active activity in a reading of Arendt’s notion of the “banality of evil” in order to emphasize and elaborate this sort of doing which undoes itself by doing precisely nothing.  A passive mental activity, this automated knowing is a cognitive exercise which produces the subject as an object. It is thus possible that, according to Kristeva, “without being stupid per se, Eichmann exhibited ‘sheer thoughtlessness’”( Kristeva 2001, 149).​[19]​  This “sheer thoughtlessness” is the hallmark of the society of the spectacle.​[20]​  Oddly, Kristeva’s condemnations of the society of the spectacle – its passivity, thoughtlessness, and roboticization – all target characteristics stereotypically attributed to femininity and female sexuality.  I have already discussed the association between passivity, thoughtlessness, and femininity; the connection between female sexuality and robots is more obscure and somewhat counterintuitive, given the well-known association between women and nature.  In an essay on Fritz Lang’s Metropolis (which is well-known to feminists, but not necessarily to philosophers), Andreas Huyssen argues that the film demonstrates the tendency, in twentieth-century Western discourses, to map dominant culture’s fear of female sexuality onto its fear of technology, and vice versa.  In the film, “technology is embodied in a female robot” (Huyssen 1985, 67), exemplifying a tendency wherein “the fears and perceptual anxieties emanating from ever more powerful machines are recast and reconstructed in terms of the male fear of female sexuality” (Huyssen 1985, 70).  As I will discuss later, Kristeva’s rejection of technological reproduction effects a repudiation of the kinds of female desire and agency manifested in contemporary pop music production and consumption.  Here, however, it strikes me as very paradoxical that Kristeva condemns the society of the spectacle for exhibiting the very same features--.e.g., the complication of active/passive and mind/body binaries— that she lauds throughout her work as feminine and feminist critiques of patriarchy.  

b. “Taste” and “good” appearance
	While she rejects “thoughtless” images, Kristeva is otherwise fairly suspicious of conventional notions of “fine art” and the art/craft distinction, particularly their traditional marginalization of the femininity and embodiment.  It is on these points that Kristeva develops Arendt’s notion of appearance, which is itself an attempt to rehabilitate the political value of a “good” image.  As opposed to the spectacle, the good image is a sort of public, shared, (and hence accessible and popular, especially in the sense of the German Alltagskultur)​[21]​ appearance wherein everyday people exhibit their genius.  Emphasizing the everyday (alltags), Kristeva explains that Arendt “made it known that the ‘appearance’ is a condition intrinsic to humanity: she reveals the irreducible singularity of each person, provided that he finds the courage to partake in the common sense of those around him”(Kristeva 2001, xvii).  The “irreducible singularity” Kristeva identifies with subjectivity emerges only when one engages conventional wisdom in order to make an appearance accessible and comprehensible to others.​[22]​  Characterized by its accessibility and the cooperative nature of its creation, the good image refuses the values of originality, independence, and refinement that ground conventional notions of fine art.  Thus, when Kristeva uses the concept of taste to differentiate good appearance from spectacle, she clearly offers a reworking of its traditional sense, most notably with respect to its reliance on mind/body and subject/object dichotomies to ground and justify the ideal of disinterestedness.  
Unlike conventional notions of taste, which prize disinterestedness, Kristeva’s use of the term emphasizes a specifically political “inter-esse” (being among others).  The Kantian ideal of disinterestedness values distance and objectivity in the sense of impartiality.  “Arendt,” however, “believes in ‘common interests’,” and thus that “esse can become inter-esse, or interest.  Interest is a ‘between men,’ at once the foundation and the aim”(Kristeva 2001, 156). Participation in the public realm is the exercise of the conventional wisdom called taste. Because one exists among others in the concrete world of particular bodies, “inter-est” implies a situated, embodied spectator, not the sort of disembodied view from nowhere idealized in notions of disinterestedness.  
Including bodily intimacy and sensory experience in her notion of taste, Kristeva critiques the somataphobic abjection of gustatory taste from the traditional conception of aesthetic taste.  While, as Carolyn Korsmeyer has argued, gustatory taste serves as the conceptual framework for aesthetic taste, the role of actual sense experience is always emphatically excluded from the operation of aesthetic taste because of the former’s connotations of embodiment, idiosyncrasy, subjectivity (partiality), and utility (eating) (Korsmeyer, 2002). Kristeva, however, thinks taste is a valuable concept precisely because it calls on both private and public, sensory and social.  Inverting the traditional metaphor, wherein sensory experience is the model for the more highly valued act of judgment, Kristeva claims that taste or “common sense…affects me as a sensation would” (Kristeva 2001, 225).  While Kristeva seeks to rehabilitate the role of the body in judgments of taste, this body is never the site of a simplistic essentialism or biological determinism, for the most private physical interiority is such because it is situated as such with regard to the public, to “common sense”.​[23]​  Thus, as it is “[t]he most intimate of the perceptions, and one that mobilizes an orality and a sense of smell that are far more internal than are the other senses (sight, hearing, and touch),” Kristeva finds that “taste nevertheless possesses the capacity to be shared”(Kristeva 2001, 181).  Taste and smell are the two senses that operate by incorporating pieces of the external world into one’s body, and blur the distinction between inside and outside in this way; additionally, taste is an experience of one’s own body, but at the same time a social and socially-conditioned experience, further intertwining the public and the private in a way which nevertheless requires them to maintain a modicum of distance.  Understood in this way, taste is common sense because it is the medium which binds the individual, intimate body with the body politic.  Kristeva’s use of taste critiques its more traditional versions by not viewing physical sensation and intellectual processes (i.e., the two aspects of the term “sense”) as exclusive; thus, gustatory taste is, for Kristeva, more than a metaphor for aesthetic/political taste.  Although Western philosophy has assigned intimate, sensuous experience a merely metaphorical relationship to the body politic, Kristeva argues – as she does in her discussions of the semiotic’s status with relationship to the symbolic – that objective, just, fair political discernment requires and has always contained physical pleasure and displeasure.  Valuing sensuous experience as a key element in a feminist, cosmopolitan, anti-totalitarian politics, Kristeva’s reworking of Kantian and Arendtian taste puts the signified and signifying body, notably the body as the site of gendered and raced difference, at the center of political theory and praxis.​[24]​
For Kristeva, taste functions both as a means of discriminating good from bad political and aesthetic phenomena, and as a means of critiquing the way Western metaphysics and patriarchy have conventionally drawn these sorts of distinctions in ways that marginalize embodiment and femininity/femaleness.  By grounding her reading of Arendtian appearance in a deconstructed notion of taste, Kristeva avoids endorsing many of the values – fear of embodiment, distance, disinterest, etc. – that motivate the traditional distinction between high art and pop.  Kristeva’s notion of taste thus critiques “the feminization of the popular.”  Insofar as the devaluation of women’s domestic labor coincides with the devaluation of women’s cultural production (i.e., they are both considered too material, consumable, transient, and subjective to be of lasting, universal value), ​[25]​ Kristeva’s re-thinking of the role of the oikos in good public appearance can, I argue, serve as the basis of a critique of Kristeva’s devaluation of the society of the spectacle, and also of a feminist revaluation of pop culture.

c. Women’s work and female genius
Included in her return to the “tasting body” is a re-valuation of the oikos and women’s work.  Contra Arendt, who privileges the political over the social, Kristeva argues that “the ‘economy’ of the household [oikia] is not limited merely to ensuring survival,” for “[t]he busy household and the bodies of women and slaves it contains were not – and still are not – destined merely for an unhappy life of labor” (Kristeva 2001, 161).  Women’s work, the care of life and of the body, is not sheer torturous labor, but can be pleasurable and creative – many people enjoy cooking, gardening, parenting, and even cleaning (e.g., I know many people who find household tasks an especially pleasant way to pass the time when it comes time to grade finals).  Because Kristeva views Arendt’s stance toward the social and towards labor as devaluing femininity, motherhood, and other sorts of so-called women’s work, she emphasizes “the limitations of Arendt’s diatribe against a society that is consumed by the economy”( Kristeva 2001, 161).
Reimagining the craft of the oikos, Kristeva offers a sort of feminine “icon” which serves as “the privileged domain of the divine presence in the political realm itself”(Kristeva 2001, 161).  Such icons are distinct from empty mass media because they maintain “their ‘economic’ bond with invisible eternity”(Kristeva 2001, 161), namely, their connection with motherhood and natality.  Taken in this light, the feminine/feminized economy of “craft” and “‘the social’…may still not have revealed all the freedoms that lurk inside it”(Kristeva 2001, 161).  Just because an activity is concerned with the life process – e.g., cooking – does not mean that it cannot be a forum for serious thought, creativity, or innovation.  In the same way that the art/craft hierarchy functions to trivialize the cultural accomplishments of women (e.g., quilting), Arendt’s privileging of the political over the social marginalizes the contributions of women to public life.  
Since, for Kristeva, taste is not something one uses to judge the work of geniuses, but is precisely the very practice of political life (as exemplified by the female genius qua mother), the distinction between activity and passivity, agent and spectator, is reworked in a way which is better able to recognize the accomplishments of women as genuine artistic and political achievements.

d. Maternity, comprehension, female genius

Unlike traditional notions of genius which idealize the independent creator ex nihilo,​[26]​ Kristeva’s notion of female genius posits “borrowing and revising” as the primary creative acts.​[27]​   If genius is a necessarily public, common act, then interaction with others and their work would seem to be a key component thereof.  Moreover, if one is always-already overdetermined by social roles and meanings, then one is never at liberty to work without responding to them in some way; only privilege could allow one the delusion of their irrelevance.  It is thus that Kristeva reads Arendt as arguing that “our freedom results from starting something entirely new within the confines of the ‘frailty of human affairs’: ‘The very capacity for beginning is rooted in natality, and by no means in creativity’”(Kristeva 2001, 45).  Kristeva is not abandoning creativity altogether; rather, in an attempt to rectify the ways in which the concept of creativity reinforces masculine privilege, Arendtian natality is offered as a model for refashioning the content and the function of this concept.
Conventional notions of agency exclude feminine/feminized means of engagement from consideration as anything other than passivity and/or false consciousness.  Because our traditional vocabulary for agency is organized by an active/passive binary, it can’t capture an economy of comprehension not based on command and obedience.  “[H]ow can we define a woman,” Kristeva asks, “if she does not give orders, execute them, influence them, or obey them?”(Kristeva 2001, 26-7).  “Com-prehension” indicates a public, collective process of intellectual engagement – the “inter-esse” of common sense.  The comprehender is feminized insofar as she is imagined, like the female reproductive system once was, as a sort of inert field which awaits “fertilization” by some masculinized element, and thus serves more as medium for the work of others than as an actual agent herself. ​[28]​  As Kristeva explains,
[t]he com-prehender waits, accepts, and welcomes; an open space, she allows herself to be used, she sets forth, she is with (cum-, com-), a matrix of studied casualness…that allows itself to be fertilized.  At the same time, the comprehender apprehends, she selects, tears down, molds, and transforms the elements; she appropriates and re-creates them.  Alongside others but accompanied by her own selection, the comprehender is one who gives birth to a meaning that harbors, in altered form, the meaning of other people (Kristeva 2001, 25-6).  

Kristeva’s discussion of comprehension performs the very same sort of transformative critique that it describes.  Calling upon very conventional (and misogynist!) imagery of woman as passive matter, Kristeva does so in order to reinvest it with a meaning and function which, while made possible only by the first misogynist one, opposes it.  The “matrix” is neither passive nor active, but exercises a sort of common inquiry which requires both guidance and leadership practiced in ways which blur the distinctions between them.​[29]​  Individual achievements are possible precisely because one inserts oneself/is inserted in an open space of appearance, where one is both seen and sees, and thus always grasps (both in the intellectual and tactile senses) in a common effort.​[30]​  While patriarchial definitions of autonomy consider collectivity to be symptomatic of weakness, dependence, and immaturity,​[31]​ in Kristeva’s view thinking with and through others is not a symptom of or means to conformity, but precisely the beginning of individual action.  “[G]oing beyond your own limit” into and among others “presents a more appealing antidote to the various forms of ‘groupthink’,” and to particularly unjust and oppressive mischaracterizations of individual liberty (Kristeva 2001, xiv).​[32]​    Spectators, in their commentary, act as both agents and recipients as they present the actions of others “in altered form;” thus, comprehension is the very activity of spectators.  While Kant distinguishes genius, the attribute of the artist, from taste, the attribute of the spectator, Kristeva, in viewing the pair of concepts as exercises – something one does rather than something one has – posits strong similarities between genius and taste.​[33]​  Female/feminized genius, the genius of comprehension, is, in this way, the genius of the tasting spectator. 
Kristeva’s notion of female genius challenges the presuppositions on which conventional serious/popular culture hierarchies are based.  Emphasizing the everydayness, and not the rare exceptionality, of genius, Kristeva locates it in the Alltagswelt, in Alltagskultur.  Because she devotes so much attention to the rehabilitation of conventionally female/feminized forms of cultural production, as well as the role of the body/embodiment/everyday lived experience in genius, it should follow that these theoretical commitments require a revaluation of pop, if only for the fact that its marginalization so frequently took the form of feminization and association with the body/bodily pleasures.  Her reading of maternity as a love for the everyday suggests precisely this, i.e., that Kristeva’s theory of female genius includes or supports a revaluation of conventional serious/pop culture hierarchies. What Kristeva finds noteworthy in the (somewhat overgeneralized or essentialized) experience of motherhood is a “concern for the Other” and “a sense of perpetual questioning” which “does not bear on an eternity or on a transcendental summum esse but on the infinite meaning of what remains well within our grasp…the ordinary one (Kristeva 2001, 47; last emphasis mine).  In her love for her child, the mother remains open to the possibility of finding something extraordinary in the everyday.  The model of the mother as spectator, as narrating the life of her child, demonstrates that Kristeva’s theory can accommodate a serious reading of popular culture, one which holds open the possibility of finding “infinite meaning” in “what remains well within our grasp,” ordinary, everyday pop culture.​[34]​  
Unfortunately, Kristeva’s writings on pop culture do not apply her theories to this end; one possible reason for this apparent contradiction between her theoretical deconstruction of serious/pop hierarchies and her practical reliance upon them is that she only values a specific kind of Alltagskultur, i.e., folk, not mass, culture.  This is particularly worrisome because her continued devaluation of pop culture seems to be grounded, at least in part, in a suspicion of technology and of non-analogue reproduction, both of the human and cultural domains.  She contrasts “[m]aternal love for the ordinary life” with “the progress of vitalist technology that can engulf this love”(Kristeva 2001, 48).  Maternity is “our only safeguard against the wholesale automation of human beings,” and thus “the most essential of the female vocations” (Kristeva 2001, xiii).​[35]​  According to Kristeva, mothers introduce into the world the sort of newness and unpredictability that mass production and digital reproduction supposedly cannot.​[36]​  Human – i.e., heterosexual – reproduction is, for Kristeva, creative in a way that post-industrial production cannot be.  “[N]o matter how far science may progress,” she argues, 
women will continue to be the mothers of humanity.  Through their love of men, too, women will continue to give birth to children.  That fate...will remain an all-consuming and irreplaceable vocation (Kristeva 2001, xiv). 

In a very heteronormative fashion, motherhood is the essential function of women.​[37]​  This connection between Kristeva’s rejection of technology and her not-so-implicit heteronormativity is made all the more clear in her claim that “[p]recisely because there are births – the fruits of men’s and women’s freedom to love one another, to think, and to judge before they become products of genetic engineering – we are able to enjoy the possibilities of will and freedom” (Kristeva 2001, 45).  Female genius and maternal love for the alltäglich does not include the domain of mass culture because, for Kristeva, these kinds of technological reproduction are passivizing, unoriginal, and non-public – ironically, all qualities of “fine art” which Kristeva’s work on taste and genius serve to critique.​[38]​
	While deconstructing traditional fine art/craft hierarchies by modeling her notion of genius after women’s work in the oikos, Kristeva nevertheless institutes a somewhat modified version of this same hierarchy in her privileging of non-commercial folk culture over mass culture.  Especially in music, this folk/mass distinction is, like the art/craft binary, a gendered one: the folk is authentic, skilled, and enduring, while the mass is inauthentic, superficial, simplistic, and faddish.  A suspicion of technology – especially digital technology – seems to motivate, at least in part, Kristeva’s deployment of this folk/mass hieararchy.  Thus, it is ironic that Kristeva grounds her condemnations of the society of the spectacle in folk/mass hierarchies both because (1) her attempt to revalue “women’s work” and female genius devalues the feminized term (mass), and (2) digital technologies seem to encourage and enable the very sorts of critical com-prehension that she identifies as the spectator’s genius.  Kristeva thinks that digital reproduction flattens difference; indeed, in her reworking of Arendtian natality, she seems to demand that artworks retain their aura – that is, that artworks (and geniuses) gain their meaning and their value as the unique product of a specific sociohistorical context and provenance.​[39]​  The best – and oftentimes most common, everyday – uses of digital technology in the creation and reception of US popular music do not flatten difference, ignore history, or encourage thoughtlessness.  With sampling being such a costly and litigious process these days, contemporary hip-hop, a genre forged from sampling, now utilizes synthesizers and various studio machines to compose hooks, beats, and backing tracks; sampling is much less common than it was in the 70s, 80s, or early 90s.  Accordingly, when artists do use samples, it is likely that it is because of that sample’s specific historical significance: since it is both less expensive and less of a hassle to write a good hook than to use a sampled one, the appeal of the sample is more likely socio-historical than formal.  For example, on an album that focuses on postcolonial politics and the plight of child soldiers, M.I.A. samples The Clash’s “Straight to Hell,” a song about a child living in South Asia in the aftermath of the Vietnam war (See M.I.A. 2007).  This sort of sampling does not erase history – it assumes and comments upon it.  Indeed, insofar as sampling involves “giv[ing] birth to a meaning that harbors, in altered form, the meaning of other people”( Kristeva 2001, 25-6), it is a prime example of what Kristeva means by com-prehension.  Further, because digital technology makes these means of production more widely accessible (anyone with a laptop or a cell phone can make music or videos – not only those with access to very expensive professional equipment and studio time), it is capable of promoting the sorts of creativity and engaged spectatorship Kristeva endorses in her theory of female genius.  While there is certainly no lack of badly-made videos of people doing idiotic things on YouTube, there is no less a lack of amazing videos that demonstrate everyday people’s ingenuity in all kinds of activities.  Besides the quite common genre of “video mash-ups,” where a sort of music/cultural criticism is practiced in the mixing of a song with various visual media, there are a seemingly infinite variety of intelligent videos on all sorts of topics: the now infamous philosopher attack ads, demonstrations on how to use and/or hack various software and hardware, cooking demonstrations…you name it, it’s probably on YouTube.  Thus, one might go so far as to argue that YouTube is a forum that enables the kind of publicity and appearance that Arendt and, in turn, Kristeva, value so highly. There is nothing inherently oppressive or liberatory about digital technologies – they can and have been employed to both kinds of ends.  Thus, to condemn them outright, as Kristeva and some of her readers do, evinces nothing but a failure to take these technologies seriously and learn how they are and can be used.

V. The Politics of the Mainstream
Theoretically, so long as the center of power remains unaffected, anything is allowed on the margins, where serious culture mostly operates (Russian pop culture seems not to ruffle any feathers, or maybe it doesn’t want to, and television is firmly under the Kremlin’s thumb) (Kimmelman 2007).

	In the previous four sections I have argued  that popular music is a theoretically and politically significant topic for feminist inquiry.  When the insights of feminist aesthetics are applied to pop culture generally, and pop music specifically, we see that serious/pop hierarchies are gendered in ways similar to the art/craft distinction, and that pop music’s aesthetic devaluation is tied into the political marginalization of women and femininity.  Moreover, insofar as the idealized performer and spectator are normatively masculine, women’s agency as creators and critics of pop music is often overlooked and discounted as such.  Kristeva’s theory of female genius (particularly her notion of spectatorship as developed through a reading of Arendt) re-thinks the gendered mind/body and self/other dichotomies which ground conventional notions of creativity and criticism, thus providing a framework for recognizing and considering the sorts of aesthetic agency which, as feminist aestheticians have shown, traditional theories do not accommodate.  For example, Kristeva’s discussions of economic activity (oikos) and on com-prehension give us a vocabulary in which to articulate the aesthetic activity exhibited by Nash’s teen idol fans: they appropriated mass-produced commodities (stars, singles, magazines) and collectively re-purposed these objects and discourses in an attempt to define their sexuality on their own (and not patriarchal) terms.  The application of Kristeva’s notion of the genius spectator to mainstream, mass-marketed pop music in turn demonstrates that Kristeva’s condemnations of the society of the spectacle are not always well-founded, and often have the consequence of discounting real women’s creative and critical agency as such – which is ironic, because this is what her theory of female genius was intended to remedy.
	The epigraph to this section comes from Michael Kimmelman’s New York Times article about Vladimir Putin’s attempts to wield political control by commanding mainstream media.  The implication of this quote is that non-mainstream media have no meaningful political impact.  Feminist aestheticians cannot afford to adopt the “Who Cares If You Listen?” attitude that prevailed in mid-twentieth century avant-garde music circles, and continues to dominate the philosophical mainstream in the US.   Feminists – both generally and feminist aestheticians specifically – need to be concerned with the mainstream.  Feminism is inherently political, and in a democracy, political change works when it impacts and is taken up in the mainstream.  If you really want to analyze and change what actual people honestly think about gender and race, there is no better place to begin than with popular culture in general, and popular music in particular.  For example, African-American studies has productively engaged rap music and hip-hop culture as sites for debating and critiquing white racism and sexism both within and without the African-American community. Moreover, in an information-based capitalist economy, mass culture is contemporary folk culture, so feminist aestheticians’ re-valuing of craft and folk artforms is a natural fit with popular music studies, especially as the availability of inexpensive and easy to use music production software has transformed the domestic space – bedrooms and basements – into the main locus of music-making.
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^1	  There is a rich literature on gender and popular music in other humanities and the social sciences, musicologists address gender and popular music, philosophers do engage popular culture, and there is some work in philosophy about feminism and music…but there’s very, very little work in philosophy proper on gender and popular music.  
^2	  Indeed, at SPEP in 2005, there was talk of keynote speaker Davis’s “return to philosophy”.  
^3	  In this issue of Hypatia, Joshua Shaw compiled an “Annotated Bibliography of Writings in Feminist Aesthetics,” which, while citing several books by art historians and film theorists, does not list any books about music or by feminist musicologists.  Since the bibliography covers 1990-2003, one would at least expect it to list Susan McClary’s seminal 1991 “Feminine Endings: Music, Gender, and Sexuality”.
^4	  “I next propose that the flute-girl who came in just now be dismissed: let her pipe to herself or, if she likes, to the women-folk within, but let us seek our entertainment today in conversation” (Plato 176e).
^5	  In the article, Irwin (the series editor) is quoted as saying that his books are “a spoonful of sugar to help the medicine go down…We need to start with popular culture and use it to bring people to philosophy,” and that his books are like “training wheels on a bicycle,” the bicycle being “properly” philosophical texts (like Descartes’ Meditations) (Asma 2007).  If philosophy suffers from a terrible image problem – being dull, dry, staid, stodgy, more Thales than the Thracian maid who laughed at him – then using pop culture to unpack “important” philosophical claims and problems is a good marketing tool.  For more on this, see the epilogue to James, 2010.
^6	  Thus, as Korsmeyer admits, “Much philosophical aesthetics already is predisposed to consider art in terms of the model of painting because of the influence of epistemology, which standardly employs visual examples in the analysis of perception and knowledge ” (2004, 2).  
^7	  See James, 2002.  Mozart’s Don Giovanni and Schoenberg’s Moses und Aron are the only two pieces she analyzes in a sustained fashion.  Usually Kristeva says something (e.g., the semiotic) is “like music” or “musical” without going into any further depth in her remark.
^8	  As Sarah Kofman (Kofman 1988), notes, Freud admits to not liking music because he doesn’t understand it, and can’t fully appreciate it.  
^9	  “The terms ‘commerce,’ commercial,’ and ‘trade’ were pejoratives that described the way ordinary people made their living” (26); similarly, “elites condemned the entertainments of the industrial working class on the basis of their commercial settings” (Scott, 41).  
^10	  In musicology, a discipline nearly as conservative as philosophy, Susan McClary, Carolyn Abbate, Susan Cook, Suzanne Cusick, and Philip Brett are the notable figures whose work on gender and music is now nearly canonical.  In gender/cultural/area studies, there is too much good work to mention it all.  Tricia Rose, Paul Gilroy, bell hooks, Shelia Whitley, Simon Frith and Angela McRobbie, Neil Nehring, Mark Anthony Neal, Imani Perry, and Gwendolyn Pough are all well-known figures whose work on gender and popular music have significantly impacted gender/cultural/area studies.
^11	  See Battersby 1989, Korsmeyer 2004, Parker & Pollock 1998.
^12	  “The category of autonomously oriented art have no applicability to the contemporary reception of music; not even for that of the serious music, domesticated under the barbarous name of classical so as to enable one to turn away from it again in comfort” (Adorno 2002, 277).
^13	  “Those items now in the craft tradition include a good many of the domestic products made by women of all classes to beautify the home and make it function comfortably…As the idea of fine art crystallized, it effectively eclipsed the many household artifacts produced by women which, however beautiful, had undeniable practical function” (Korsmeyer 2004, 6).
^14	  For more on the relationship among whiteness, masculinity, and aesthetic agency, see James, 2009.
^15	   “Adults and rocker teens united in believing that teen-idol music was intrinsically bad and that our consumption of it proved our ‘immaturity’: just as it supposedly signaled our unreadiness for real males, so it supposedly signaled our unreadiness for real music” (Nash 2003, 146); “what precisely did they think we should be ready for?  Abuse and assault?” (Nash 2003, 140).
^16	  As Angela McRobbie explains, “Women are so obviously inscribed (marginalsied, abused) within subcultures as static objects (girlfriends, whores or ‘faghags’)  that access to its thrills, to hard fast rock music, to drugs, alcohol, and ‘style,’ would hardly be compensation even for the most adventurous teenage girl” (cited in Gottleib and Wald 1994, 7).
^17	  In The Racial Contract, Charles Mills argues that in the West, the term “human” has been defined in a way that prevents non-whites from being seen as such.  The Racial Contract is, then, an agreement among privileged whites to fail to see non-whites as properly or fully human.  Thus, as Mills explains, “the Racial Contract prescribes for its signatories an inverted epistemology, an epistemology of ignorance, a particular pattern of localized and global cognitive dysfunctions (which are psychologically and socially functional)” (Mills, Charles. 1997. The Racial Contract. Ithaca: Cornell UP, p.18).  
^18	  One wonders what, if any, relationship this dynamic bears to Freud’s notion of femininity as an active passivity: is Kristeva here engaging in the same sort of feminization of the popular which she critiques in her reworking of the oikos (which I discuss later)?
^19	 If this thoughtless cognition, this non-thinking thought, is present in popular culture, it exists at the level of a certain formulaic logic by which works maintain both formal and contextual coherence.  For example, this is what allows us to predict what’s going to happen next in a film (the bad guy is his father!), and what situates a work in the norms of a given society and thus allows it to “make sense” to its audience.  
^20	  In their Culture Industry essay, Adorno and Horkheimer describe a similar phenomenon: pop culture does require a certain level of skill to access (e.g., video games require extensive habituation to a generally very complex controller), but that the work involved in the experience of pop culture is mere “busywork” devoid of meaningful content or purpose.  See Adorno & Horkheimer, 1976.
^21	  “On the one hand,” explains Kristeva, “spectators are always plural in number because the experience of a spectator must be validated by the experience of other people, which is what generates ‘common sense’ as opposed to ‘private sense’” (Kristeva 2001, 223).  Contrasting “common sense” to “private sense”, Kristeva emphasizes the necessary accessibility of that which is judged to be “good” appearance.
^22	  “‘How I am understood by others’ – is the actor’s primary concern,” since, “beautiful objects…are created by the judgment of spectators and critics” (Kristeva 2001, 223).  
^23	  “[S]ensus communis or ‘common sense,’ is what gives us the sensation of reality…common sense stabilizes and unifies the real” (Kristeva 2001, 190).
^24	  However, what is missing from Kristeva’s discussion of taste and its role in creating/maintaining a public realm is the role this notion played and continues to play in maintaining hegemonic white privilege and Eurocentrism.  As Christine Battersby and others have argued, “taste” was not something women and non-Europeans were thought capable of exercising.  Indeed, the fact that non-Western people did not produce what Europeans considered “fine art,” did not share their aesthetic and moral values, and did not exhibit refined discrimination – i.e., appeared “immature” and “savage” – was frequently used as justification for their exclusion from the properly, fully human community, the community which could claim “human rights”.  Thus, when Kristeva claims that “I am a member of the world community and of its potential for peace merely because I am someone who is capable of taste and/or judgment” (Kristeva 2001, 227), Kristeva continues the same Eurocentric logic found in traditional conceptions of taste.
^25	  On the devaluation of women’s cultural production, see Parker and Pollock 1998. 
^26	  This conception of genius is not unrelated to the Judeo-Christian notion of God the Father, as Christine Battersby has argued in Battersby 1989.
^27	  “[T]he intersection between this borrowing and revising gives rise to Arendt’s conception of life and birth, which she sees…as the ultimate experience of renewable meaning” (Kristeva 2001, 45).  
^28	  Carolyn Korsmeyer argues that the collective nature of many traditionally female-dominated artforms – e.g., quilting – has led to their exclusion from consideration as “real” or “fine” art. See Korsmeyer 2004.
^29	  One who “is innovative and takes initiative” must be, for Kristeva, “[a]t once and agent and a recipient” (Kristeva 2001, 77).
^30	  In the last section of the Colette book, “Is There a Feminine Genius?”, Kristeva explains that the girl’s Oedipal experience “appears not to be dominated by a simple passivation but, alongside and beyond it, by a setting in place of an interactive subjectivity that cannot be interpreted in terms of a simple active/passive dichotomy” (Kristeva 2004, 411).
^31	  For more on this see Winnubst 2006.
^32	  Arendt “emphasizes that action is impossible in isolation,” because “[o]nly the sovereign is isolated, and an innovative actor is not necessarily a sovereign” (Kristeva 2001, 77).  Indeed, it is notions of independence-as-sovereignty that ground the conventional notions of taste and genius which Kristeva’s reading of Arendt is intended to critique.  
^33	  In her essay “What is Freedom?”, Arendt makes a similar distinction between freedom as “attribute” and freedom as “status”.  In contrast to classical liberal notions of freedom which view it as something one attains or “has,” Arendt argues that freedom, as both the condition of possibility for and the raison d’etre of politics, is something that one exercises in relation to others (i.e., a status).  See Arendt 1993.
^34	  Indeed, Kristeva values psychoanalysis because it “helps keep open, both parallel to the maternal journey and apart from it, the question of life as meaning and meaning as life” (Kristeva 2001, 47).
^35	  An interesting counterposition to Kristeva’s claim that “maternity” stands opposed to “cloning” and “technological reproduction” is Kelis’s video for her 2010 song Acapella.  The video uses Afrofuturist imagery and music aesthetics to suggest that dominant narratives of maternity and femininity (as “natural” and distinct from contemporary technology) do not value women of color as mothers (and perhaps even pathologizes mothers of color).  The song itself is about the birth of Kelis’s son: “Before  you,” the chorus goes, “my whole life was acapella”.  In the last shot of the video, Kelis is shown carrying her infant son, thus making it clear that he is the “you” who now accompanies her.  This song and video about motherhood makes ample use of digital (re)production: from the video editing (notice the stutters) to the entirely synthesized backing track, Acapella fully embraces and exploits the “automation” Kristeva so fears.  Most notably, the instrumental backing track (and the compositional form)  is based not on development (as is Western tonality), but on looped repetition: the song is a series of “cloned” beats.  Given the connection between the cultural value of repetition (especially as opposed to development) and Afrodiasporic cultures (See Snead 1981), Kelis can be read as arguing that the white/Western devaluation of mothers of color is tied into white/Western fears of technology and repetition; the de-pathologization of mothers of color is tied to a revaluation of repetition.
^36	  I wonder if Kristeva has really thought much about the differences between analogue industrial and digital reproduction.  Mass production might thrive on interchangeability, conformity, and surplus/superfluity, but does digital reproduction?  Does digital reproduction function in ways which encourage, facilitate, or even demands the sort of “comprehension” Kristeva so values?  Take, for example, digital photography.  People take pictures on their cell phones and email them directly to their friends, usually with an accompanying text message.  For instance, someone bombed the UNCC campus with Super-Mario-Brothers-inspired graffiti in January 2007; I used my phone to take a picture of the 1-up mushroom very nicely pixilated on the bricks of the building next to my office.  I then sent this to my friend in the art department, wondering if one of her students was behind this (because I thought it was a fun and well-executed project).  Is this not the very sort of public spectating Kristeva values?  For example, the Hollaback project (http://www.hollabackchitown.blogspot.com/) is a blog where women both catalogue written narratives of their experiences of street harassment, and, more interestingly for my purposes here, collect photos, taken on cell phones, of perpetrators of street harassment.  Certainly the action being narrated here is not “heroic,” but its verbal and visual narration do perform an important political function.  It also is a concrete example where digital technology and reproduction are used in ways consistent with Kristeva’s notion of spectating.  Moreover, digital technology makes it exponentially easier to alter the work of others: pictures are photoshoped, video and music tracks are mashed-up, spliced, hacked.  Indeed, I would argue that digital technology does not discourage, but makes the sort of spectating Kristeva advocates easier and more accessible.
^37	  For more on the connections between heteronormativity and reactionary views of technology, as well as the role of technology in queer theory, see Haraway 1991.  
^38	  In “Thinking About Liberty in Dark Times,” Kristeva argues that comprehension, the activity of female genius, “the whole idea of ‘transplant’ or ‘graft’ [is] meant to generate unexpected consequences, the very opposite of cloning” (Kristeva 2004).  Distinguishing between more traditional sorts of artificial reproduction (transplantation, grafting) and more contemporary sorts of intervention into cells themselves, Kristeva falsely separates out contemporary “technology” from more conventional interventions into “natural” reproduction.  Cloning is thought as a sort of exact repetition, with no room for either variation or unintended results (this idea of unintended results also accords with Kant’s notion of the genius who knows not what s/he creates).  However, if we take Judith Butler’s notion of performative repetition seriously, then repetition itself is precisely the site and source of variation and subversion.
^39	  Walter Benjamin famously describes the “aura” of a work of art as follows: “in the case of the art object, a most sensitive nucleus – namely, its authenticity – is interfered with whereas no natural object is vulnerable on that score.  The authenticity of a thing is the essence of all that is transmissible from its beginning, ranging from its substantive duration to its testimony to the history which it has experienced” (Benjamin 2003, 521).
^40	  See Huyssen 1985. I would doubly emphasize that this book came out in 1985 (that’s twenty-five years ago), and its claim regarding the feminization of mass culture is still absent from almost all of the literature in philosophy.
